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LANDOWNERS OR LIFEGUARDS?
DEGEL v. MAJESTIC MOBILE MANOR, INC.
AND LIABILITY FOR VISITORS' INJURIES
FROM NATURAL BODIES OF WATER
Joseph Z. Lell
Abstract: Under an exception to the attractive nuisance doctrine, landowners typically
owe no duty to warn and protect trespassing children from the dangers inherent in ponds,
streams, and other natural bodies of water located on the owners' property. In Degel v.
Majestic Mobile Manor, Inc., however, the Washington Supreme Court declined to extend
this premises liability exception to situations where the injured visitor is an invitee of the
landowner. This Note examines the natural bodies of water exception and argues that Degels
refusal to apply it in the invitee context ultimately conflicts with the court's earlier policy
statement favoring access to the state's waterways. The Note concludes by proposing an
analytical framework that would ensure the continued recreational, visual, and environmental
benefits derived from unfenced bodies of water located on business property, while
simultaneously maintaining a duty of affirmative care upon landowners to protect invitees
from water hazards only under carefully limited circumstances.
The numerous ponds, lakes, rivers, creeks, and miles of shoreline in
this state comprise one of its most cherished amenities, and to
require that they be drained, filled, or surrounded by impregnable
fences (which appear to be the only means of making them child
prooJ) in order to escape liability for the occasional drowning
which occurs, would not only impose an unreasonable burden
on the owner but would also run counter to the public policy
of this state.
Ochampaugh v. City of Seattle'
Throughout its judicial history, Washington has consistently shielded
its landowners from liability whenever visitors have sustained injuries
from natural bodies of water on the owners' premises.2 In Degel v.
1. 91 Wash. 2d 514,523,588 P.2d 1351, 1356 (1979).
2. Prior to 1996, no reported Washington decision had imposed liability upon a landowner for
personal injuries caused by the dangers inherent in a natural body of water, regardless of the injured
party's status or age. Brief of Respondent at 5, Degel v. Majestic Mobile Manor, Inc., 129 Wash. 2d
43, 914 P.2d 728 (1996) (No. 62312-1). Washington courts have, however, occasionally permitted
landowner liability for artificial water bodies or man-made conditions associated with the water. See,
e.g., Kilmer v. Bean, 48 Wash. 2d 848, 296 P.2d 992 (1956) (refusing to preclude liability for
drowning death of minor licensee who fell into concealed underwater excavation); Grove v.
D'Allessandro, 39 Wash. 2d 421,235 P.2d 826 (1951) (imposing liability upon beach resort operator
for injuries suffered by invitee who dived from 20-foot slide tower into shallow water); Corum v.
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Majestic Mobile Manor, Inc.,3 however, the Washington Supreme Court
sharply limited this policy by refusing to exempt natural bodies of water
from the general rule requiring landowners to exercise reasonable care
for the safety of their business invitees.
Degel involved a three-year-old invitee who nearly drowned after
falling into a swift-flowing creek located on the premises of the mobile
home park where his parents resided as tenants.4 The child's father
brought suit against the landlord, alleging that the mobile home park was
negligent, inter alia, for maintaining such a dangerous condition on its
property without adequate safeguards.5 Reversing the district court's
grant of summary judgment for the mobile home park owner and
remanding the case for trial, the Degel majority held that a landowner's
duty of reasonable care to protect invitees is not excused merely because
the injurious condition is a natural body of water.6
Degel's significance is twofold. First, the ruling continues the
Washington judiciary's recent trend of permitting landowner liability
when visitors suffer injuries from natural conditions on the owner's
property.7 Second, although the decision in Degel is consistent with the
majority view nationally, it nevertheless ultimately contradicts the
court's previously enunciated statement of public policy condemning the
fencing or destruction of the state's waterways.8 As such, Degel
underscores the necessity of creating a new analytical fiamework that
would more effectively and fairly balance the competing public policies
implicated in the case.
Part I of this Note provides a general overview of premises liability
law in Washington and examines a landowner's respective duty to
protect trespassers, licensees, and invitees from natural hazards on the
Blomquist, 116 Wash. 196, 198 P. 727 (1921) (permitting liability against artificial swimming pool
operator for drowning death of child).
3. 129 Wash. 2d 43, 914 P.2d 728 (1996).
4. Id. at 45-46, 914 P.2d at 729.
5. Id. at 47, 914 P.2d at 730.
6. Id. at 45-46, 914 P.2d at 729.
7. See, e.g., Tincani v. Inland Empire Zoological Soc'y, 124 Wash. 2d 121, 135, 875 P.2d 621,
629 (1994) (stating that natural conditions do not necessarily constitute open and apparent dangers as
matter of law); Geise v. Lee, 84 Wash. 2d 866, 529 P.2d 1054 (1975) (ab;mdoning traditional
"Massachusetts rule" by imposing duty upon landlords to remove natural accumulations of ice and
snow from common areas of rental premises).
8. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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land. Part II describes the so-called "natural bodies of water doctrine,"9
which insulates landowners from liability when trespassing children are
injured by natural waterways on the owner's property. Part III discusses
the facts, arguments, disposition, and reasoning of Degel. Part IV argues
that Degel will effectively result in a significant restriction of access to
streams, ponds, lakes, and rivers located on business property throughout
the state. Finally, Part V suggests a model rule that would better
incorporate the public policy favoring such access.
I. WASHINGTON PREMISES LIABILITY LAW WITH RESPECT
TO DANGEROUS CONDITIONS ON PROPERTY
Washington's traditional common law approach classifies visitors
entering a landowner's property as either invitees, licensees, or
trespassers. 10 An entrant's status under this tripartite system generally
determines the scope of a landowner's or occupier's duty of warning and
protection."t
A. Invitees, Licensees, and Trespassers
The most protected entrants are invitees, defined under Washington
law as persons "whose visit involves actual or potential pecuniary benefit
to the occupier, or... who [have] responded to a public invitation which
expressly or impliedly represents that reasonable care has been taken for
persons so entering."' 2 A landowner's duty to safeguard and warn
invitees of dangerous conditions on the property is governed by the tests
established in Restatement (Second) of Torts sections 343 and 343A.
9. Degel, 129 Wash. 2d at 51, 914 P.2d at 732. The Washington Supreme Court has never
explicitly recognized the existence of a "natural bodies of water doctrine" as such, and it employed
the term in Degel only in response to the defendant's brief.
10. Tincani, 124 Wash. 2d at 128, 875 P.2d at 624. Washington's recreational use statute has
implicitly created an additional class of entrant referred to as a "recreational user." See Wash. Rev.
Code § 4.24.210 (1996); see also Van Dinter v. City of Kennewick, 64 Wash. App. 930, 827 P.2d
329 (1988), aff'd, 121 Wash. 2d 38, 846 P.2d 522 (1993).
11. Tincani, 124 Wash. 2d at 128, 875 P.2d at 624. The Washington Supreme Court has occa-
sionally expressed an apparent willingness to abandon its entrant classification system in favor of a
single standard of reasonable care under all circumstances. See Martha V. Trump, Comment,
Landowner or Occupier Duty of Care, 16 Gonz. L. Rev. 479, 490-91 (1981) (discussing Sherman v.
City of Seattle, 57 Wash. 2d 233, 356 P.2d 316 (1960), and Potts v. Amis, 62 Wash. 2d 777, 384
P.2d 825 (1963)); see also Tincani, 124 Wash. 2d at 142, 875 P.2d at 632. Thus far, however, the
court has ultimately chosen to retain the traditional model. See, e.g., id. at 129, 875 P.2d at 625.
12. Recent Developments, Land Occupier Liability in Washington, 43 Wash. L. Rev. 867, 875
(1968) (citing Ward v. Thompson, 57 Wash. 2d 655,659-60,359 P.2d 143, 145 (1961)).
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Under Section 343, a landowner is liable for failing to exercise
reasonable care to protect invitees when the owner should reasonably
have known of the dangerous condition and the risk it poSed, and of the
invitees' probable failure to either recognize the danger or to protect
themselves from it.13 Significantly, even as to known dangers of an "open
and obvious" nature, a landowner owes a duty of affirmative care to
invitees under section 343A if the owner "should anticipate the harm
despite such knowledge or obviousness."' 4
Washington law defines licensees as visitors who are "privileged to
enter or remain on land only by virtue of the possessor's consent."'"
Included under this entrant category are social guests invited onto the
property without mutuality of economic benefit. 6 Typically, landowners
are obligated merely to avoid willfully or wantonly injuring their
licensees. 7 With respect to dangerous conditions on the premises, a
landowner incurs liability for failing to warn or protect licensees only if
(1) the owner should know that the condition poses an umeasonable risk
of harm and that the licensee will fail to recognize the danger; and (2) the
licensee does not in fact have reason to know of the risk involved."
Under this standard, owners owe no duty to warn licensees of "open and
apparent" natural dangers. 9
Trespassers, the least protected entrants under Washington law, are
those who enter property "without invitation or permission, express or
implied, but [enter], rather, for [their] own purposes or convenience, and
not in the performance of a duty to the owner or one in possession of the
premises.'"2" Landowners ordinarily owe no duty to trespassers except to
refrain from causing willful or wanton injury to them,2' and are generally
13. Tincani, 124 Wash. 2d at 138, 875 P.2d at 630 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343
(1965)).
14. lid at 139, 875 P.2d at 631 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343A(I)).
15. Id at 133, 875 P.2d at 627 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 330).
16. Kalinski v. Young Women's Christian Ass'n, 17 Wash. 2d 380, 389-90, 135 P.2d 852, 857
(1943).
17. Degel v. Majestic Mobile Manor, Inc., 129 Wash. 2d 43, 49, 914 P.2d 728. 731 (1996).
18. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 342; see also Memel v. Reimer, 85 Wash. 2d 685, 538 P.2d
517 (1975).
19. Tincani, 124 Wash. 2d at 135, 875 P.2d at 629. Whether such a hazard is "open and apparent,"
however, turns on the factual question of whether the licensee knew or had reason to know of the full
extent of the risk. Id,
20. Schock v. Ringling Bros. and Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, 5 Wash. 2d 599, 605, 105
P.2d 838, 842 (1940), overruled on other grounds by Potts v. Amis, 62 Wash. 2d 777, 384 P.2d 825
(1963), and Laudermilk v. Carpenter, 78 Wash. 2d 92,457 P.2d 1004 (1969).
21. Winter v. Mackner, 68 Wash. 2d 943, 945,416 P.2d 453,454 (1966).
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not obligated to warn of or rectify dangerous conditions on the property
for the trespassers' benefit.' Trespassers therefore enter at their own
peril,' and, absent special circumstances, are typically unable to recover
for injuries sustained while on a landowner's premises.24
B. Washington's Attractive Nuisance Doctrine
The attractive nuisance doctrine represents a judicially-created
exception to the general absence of duty owed to trespassers. Under this
well-established rule, a landowner incurs liability for injuries to
trespassing children caused by dangerous conditions on the owner's
property when: (1) the condition is so dangerous that injury to children is
probable; (2) the condition is alluring to young children; (3) the children
attracted are incapable, due to their youth, of comprehending the danger
involved; (4) the condition is left unguarded and exposed at a place
where children could reasonably be expected to visit; and (5) the owner
could reasonably have either rendered the condition harmless or
prevented access to it without obstructing any reasonable purpose for
which it was intended.'
The strong public policy favoring the protection of children,26 coupled
with the recognition that children often are unable to protect themselves
from the hazards they encounter, form the rationale for this exception.27
Machinery, playground equipment, firearms, partially-concealed fires,
abandoned vehicles, electrical wires, and construction materials are
among the numerous dangers for which Washington courts have invoked
22. Bolden v. Independent Order of Odd Fellows, 133 Wash. 293, 297-98, 233 P. 273, 275
(1925).
23. Winter, 68 Wash. 2d at 945,416 P.2d at 454.
24. One exception to the general absence of duty owed to trespassers is the "tender years"
doctrine formulated in Sherman v. Seattle, 57 Wash. 2d 233, 356 P.2d 316 (1960), and Helland v.
Arland, 14 Wash. 2d 32, 126 P.2d 594 (1942). Under this theory, landowners owe a duty of
reasonable care to ensure that their activities avoid injuring very young children of whose presence
the owners are cognizant, irrespective of the children's entrant status. Tincani, 124 Wash. 2d at 130,
875 P.2d at 626. The "tender years" doctrine is distinguished from the attractive nuisance doctrine in
that it focuses on the landowners' activities rather than specific dangerous conditions on the
premises. See infra Part I.B.
25. Ochampaugh v. City of Seattle, 91 Wash. 2d 514, 518, 588 P.2d 1351, 1354 (1979) (citing
Schock, 5 Wash. 2d at 616, 105 P.2d at 846).
26. Id at 518, 588 P.2d at 1353; Leon Green, Landowners' Responsibility to Children, 27 Tex.
L. Rev. 1, 12-13 (1948); William L. Prosser, Trespassing Children, 47 Cal. L. Rev. 427,429 (1959).
27. Prosser, supra note 26, at 461.
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the attractive nuisance doctrine to impose liability upon landowners.28
Washington follows the majority position and limits the application of
the doctrine to children of "tender years.
29
The corresponding Restatement rule, cited favorably by Washington
courts, grants a more expansive reach to the doctrine by omitting the
requirement that the dangerous condition be alluring to children. ° Unlike
Washington's rule, however, the Restatement specifically limits its
application to artificial conditions.3'
II. THE "NATURAL BODIES OF WATER DOCTRINE":
THE ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE DOCTRINE'S EXCEPTION
FOR NATURAL BODIES OF WATER
A. Overview of the Natural Bodies of Water Exception
One prominent exception to the attractive nuisance doctrine is the
general rule absolving landowners from any duty to protect trespassing
children from the dangers associated with natural bodies of water.
Although courts have frequently acknowledged the inherently attractive
28. See, e.g., Mathis v. Swanson, 68 Wash. 2d 424, 413 P.2d 662 (1966) ([-beam); Brannon v.
Harmon, 56 Wash. 2d 826, 355 P.2d 792 (1960) (partially-hidden fire); Talkirgton v. Washington
Water Power Co., 96 Wash. 386, 165 P. 87 (1917) (electrical wire); Ilwaco Ry. & Navigation Co. v.
Hedrick, 1 Wash. 446,25 P. 335 (1890) (railway turntable); Preston by Preston v. Pierce County, 48
Wash. App. 887, 741 P.2d 71 (1987) (merry-go-round), overruled on othergrounds by Van Dinter v.
City of Kennewick, 64 Wash. App. 930, 827 P.2d 329 (1988); Guard v. Town of Friday Harbor, 22
Wash. App. 758, 592 P.2d 652 (1979) (loaded firearm left in unlocked automobile); Gabel v. Koba,
1 Wash. App. 684,463 P.2d 237 (1969) (abandoned truck).
29. Assessing whether a trespassing child satisfies the "tender years" criteria appears to involve a
three-part analysis that examines the child's age, his or her mental capacity, and the nature of the
dangerous instrumentality or condition on the owner's property. See, e.g., Harson v. Freigang, 55
Wash. 2d 70, 74, 345 P.2d 1109, 1111 (1959) ("A child of tender years is one who, because of
insufficient age, knowledge, experience, intelligence, judgment and discretin, is incapable of
deliberating and acting upon his own experience and judgment."); see also Ma.'his, 68 Wash. 2d at
427, 413 P.2d at 663-64 (permitting jury question as to whether 13-year-old was incapable, because
of his youth, of recognizing danger presented by I-beam); Hanson, 55 Wash. 2d at 74, 345 P.2d at
1111 (holding that, absent allegation of mental deficiency, 15-year-old child fails to satisfy "tender
years" criteria); McDermott v. Kaczmarek, 2 Wash. App. 643, 654-55, 469 P.2d 191, 198-99
(1970) (holding attractive nuisance doctrine inapplicable where seven-year-old child should have
realized danger of falling from cliff in abandoned quarry).
30. See Degel v. Majestic Mobile Manor, Inc., 129 Wash. 2d 43, 51-52, 914 P.2d 732-33 (1996)
(citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 339 (1965)); Ochampaugh, 91 Wash. 2d at 519, 588 P.2d at
1354 (same).
31. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 339.
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and alluring nature of streams, ponds, lakes, and rivers,32 they have
generally shown great reluctance to impose liability upon landowners for
failing to warn or protect trespassing children from the danger posed by
such water bodies.3
Numerous legal and policy considerations underlie this judicial
hesitance.34 Some courts stress the natural origin of the water to justify
their refusal to impose a duty of care upon the landowner.3 5 Others focus
on the open and obvious nature of the water's danger, reasoning that
children too young to appreciate the hazards posed by natural bodies of
water will be protected by their parents. 6 Other jurisdictions base their
reluctance on the relative improbability of injury in light of the extensive
recreational use made of such waterways.37 Still others emphasize the
impracticability of truly "childproofing" the waterfront, stressing that
any utility derived from a pond or stream would be destroyed by
imposing an implicit duty upon the landowner to either fill or fence it.38
The natural bodies of water exception has been extended in most
jurisdictions to encompass artificial bodies of water possessing natural
characteristics. Landowners have thus enjoyed immunity for injuries
caused to trespassing children by artificially-formed ponds, lakes, canals,
drainage ditches, reservoirs, and other man-made conditions located on
their property.39 Public policy concerns have formed much of the impetus
32. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Huidekoper, 27 App. D.C. 154, 164 (D.C. Cir. 1906) ("[You might as
well try to damn the Nile... as to keep boys away from ponds, pools, and other bodies of water.");
Fitch v. Selwyn Village, 68 S.E.2d 255, 257 (N.C. 1951); Ochampaugh, 91 Wash. 2d at 526, 588
P.2d at 1358; Barnhart v. Chicago, Minneapolis & St. Paul Ry. Co., 89 Wash. 304, 306-07, 154 P.
441,442 (1916).
33. See Prosser, supra note 26, at 456.
34. See generally Heywood H. Davis, Note, Negligence-Condition and Use ofLand-Care as to
Children Trespassers, 5 U. Kan. L. Rev. 123, 124 (1956); Pat H. Scanlon, Comment, Torts-
Attractive Nuisance Doctrine-Liability for Drowning of Trespassing Child, 29 Miss. L.J. 355, 357
(1958).
35. See, e.g., Cobb v. Lowe Mfg. Co., 150 So. 687, 688 (Ala. 1933).
36. See, e.g., Salladay v. Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co., 100 P. 441, 443 (Ariz.
1909).
37. See, e.g., Sullivan, 27 App. D.C. at 160.
38. See, e.g., Emond v. Kimberly-Clark Co., 149 N.W. 760,761 (Wis. 1914).
39. See, e.g., Bailey v. City of Mobile, 296 So. 2d 149, 152 (Ala. 1974) (drainage ditch);
Hanners v. City of Ashland, 331 S.W.2d 729, 730 (Ky. 1959) (reservoir); Loveland v. Orem City
Corp., 746 P.2d 763, 772 (Utah 1987) (canal). Courts are divided, however, as to whether attractive
nuisance liability may be imposed for artificial swimming pools. Compare Mozier v. Parsons, 887
P.2d 692, 698 (Kan. 1995) (refusing to apply attractive nuisance doctrine), with Reynolds v. Willson,
331 P.2d 48, 52 (Cal. 1958) (applying Restatement of Torts § 339 to swimming pool), and King v.
Lennen, 348 P.2d 98, 101 (Cal. 1959) (permitting recovery where infant trespasser was too young to
appreciate dangers presented by pool).
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for expanding the exception; the arid southwestern states' refusal to
extend attractive nuisance liability to canals, for example, stems from
judicial recognition of that region's crucial need for irrigation water.4"
Typically, the presence of additional dangerous features exacerbating
the risk of injury from water bodies fails to alter the general rule of
nonliability, provided that such conditions are common to watercourses
in nature. Thus, neither the steepness4 nor slickness42 of a waterway's
bank,4 3 the force of its current,' or the opaqueness of its waters45 usually
suffices to impose a duty of care upon the landowner to safeguard
trespassing children. Attractive nuisance liability is also usually
precluded where the water's surface is covered by a layer of ice and
snow, provided that the danger remains open and obvious.46
Notwithstanding the general judicial consensus., courts have
occasionally held the attractive nuisance doctrine applicable to bodies of
water when additional circumstances or justifications compel such a
result. Attractive nuisance liability for water bodies has thus periodically
been imposed due to the presence of a hidden or unusual danger
connected with the waterway,47 its proximity to a populated area,4" the
fact that the water body was artificially formed,4 9 the existence of some
extraneous attraction or bait enticing to children, 0 the landowner's actual
40. See, e.g., Salladay, 100 P. at 442; Trujillo v. Brighten-North Point Irrigation Co., 746 P.2d
780, 782 (Utah 1987); Loveland, 746 P.2d at 772-73.
41. See, e.g., Luallen v. Woodstock Iron & Steel Corp., 184 So. 182, 183 (Ala. 1938).
42. See, e.g., Cox v. Alabama Water Co., 112 So. 352, 356 (Ala. 1927).
43. But see, e.g., Wheeler v. St. Helens, 58 P.2d 501, 506 (Or. 1936) (considering precipitous
nature of banks in deciding to impose liability when such steepness effectivdy prevented children
from escaping).
44. See, e.g., McCabe v. American Woolen Co., 124 F. 283, 284 (C.C. Mass. 1903).
45. See, e.g., King v. Simons Brick Co., 126 P.2d 627, 629 (Cal. Ct App. 1942).
46. See, e.g., Wood v. Consumers Co., 79 N.E.2d 826, 827 (II1. App. Ct. 1948); Waters v. United
States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 369 N.W.2d 755, 759 (Wis. Ct App. 1985).
47. See, e.g., Cooper v. City of Reading, 140 A.2d 792, 798 (Pa. 1958) (permitting liability for
deep hole in seemingly shallow, muddy pool).
48. See, e.g., Barlow v. Gurney, 29 S.E.2d 681, 682 (N.C. 1944) (imposing duty of care upon
pond owner when pond was located near village and presence of children was known and
inevitable).
49. See, e.g., Sanchez v. East Contra Costa Irrigation Co., 271 P. 1060, 1061 (Cal. 1928) (refusing
to absolve from liability owner of irrigation ditch with syphon mechanism since owner had chosen to
maintain dangerous artificial hazard).
50. See, e.g., Smith v. Evans, 284 P.2d 1065, 1067 (Kan. 1955) (holding prtsence of diving board
sufficient to transform artificial pond into attractive nuisance).
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knowledge of children present,5 ' or the ease of rendering the particular
watercourse less harmful through adequate precautions. 2  The
Restatement likewise permits recovery when the landowner should have
reasonably anticipated the presence of infants too immature to appreciate
the dangers posed by the water. 3
B. The Natural Bodies of Water Exception in Washington
1. Historical Development
The "natural bodies of water doctrine" was first recognized by the
Washington Supreme Court as an exception to the general rule of
attractive nuisance liability in Barnhart v. Chicago, Minneapolis &
St. Paul Railway Co.' Holding the doctrine inapplicable to the dangers
posed by an artificial pond in which a trespassing eight-year-old boy
drowned after falling from a makeshift raft, the court emphasized the
significant recreational enjoyment afforded by such waters relative to the
small number of drownings.55 The Barnhart court acknowledged the
enticing nature of the pond, the fact that children were known to play
along its shores, and the many deaths resulting from such unfenced
bodies of water.5 Nevertheless, the court reasoned that such concerns
were outweighed by the open and apparent nature of the water's danger,
the impracticability of effectively preventing child access, and the
"oppressive burden" upon landowners that would result from imposing a
duty of care under the circumstances.57 The Barnhart rule was
subsequently reaffirmed in Smith v. McGoldrick Lumber Co., 8 where the
court refused to apply the attractive nuisance doctrine to a naturally-
51. See, e.g., Altenbach v. Lehigh Valley Ry. Co., 37 A.2d 429, 430 (Pa. 1944) (permitting
liability for reservoir located adjacent to street and sidewalk in populated area where children resided
and were known to play).
52. See, e.g., Larson v. Equity Coop. Elevator Co., 21 N.W.2d 253, 254-56 (Wis. 1946)
(recognizing propriety of imposing liability under Restatement § 339 where, inter alia, landowner
could easily have provided safeguards without interfering with water body's function).
53. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 339 cmt.j, illus. 7 (1965).
54. 89 Wash. 304, 154 P.441 (1916).
55. Ma at 307, 154 P. at 442.
56. Id. at 305-07, 154 P. at 442-43.
57. Id at308, 154P. at443.
58. 124 Wash. 363,214 P. 819 (1923).
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formed millpond despite the "extraordinary hazard cf entrapment" 9
posed by a carpet of logs floating on the pond.'
The Washington court further developed the liability exception for
waterways in Meyer v. General Electric Co.,61 where an unattended
trespassing infant drowned in a commercially-operated ditch. Holding as
a matter of law that an artificial body of water with natural characteristics
does not constitute an attractive nuisance, the court stressed that parents,
not landowners, bear the ultimate responsibility for protecting children
too young to recognize the inherent dangers of such obvious hazards.62
Paralleling the national majority view, however, Washington courts
have refused to exempt watercourses from attractive nuisance liability
when deceptive and unappreciable dangers are present.63 Thus, in
Bjork v. City of Tacoma" the court permitted recovery for a trespassing
infant who drowned after being sucked into an uncovercd opening in an
otherwise enclosed flume.65 Bjork distinguished the covered flume from
waterways with natural characteristics by noting the improbability of
rescue or escape once a child has fallen into the foner.66 Absent a
hidden danger associated with the water, however, the risk of entrapment
alone apparently remains insufficient to trigger attractive nuisance
liability.
67
2. Modern Statement of the Rule
Ochampaugh v. City of Seattle68 represents the Washington Supreme
Court's most recent and thorough explanation of the attractive nuisance
doctrine's exception for natural bodies of water. Despite the presence of
several exacerbating factors, the Ochampaugh court refused to apply the
59. Ochampaugh v. City of Seattle, 91 Wash. 2d 514, 521, 588 P.2d 1351, 1355 (1979)
(discussing Smith).
60. Smith, 124 Wash. at 365, 214 P. at 820.
61. 46 Wash. 2d 251,280 P.2d 257 (1955).
62. Id at 253-54, 280 P.2d at 258-59.
63. Id at 253, 280 P.2d at 258.
64. 76 Wash. 225, 135 P. 1005 (1913).
65. A flume is defined as "an inclined channel for conveying water." ebster's Ninth New
Collegiate Dictionary 476 (1989). The court described the flume in Bjork as "an inclosed [sic] box"
used to carry water to the local reservoir. Bjork 76 Wash. at 231, 135 P. at 1003.
66. Bjork, 76 Wash. at 231, 135 P. at 1008. The flume's danger was al:o exacerbated by its
proximity to a popular child play area.
67. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text
68. 91 Wash. 2d 514,588 P.2d 1351 (1979).
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doctrine to an artificially-formed pond in which two boys, ages six and
eight, drowned. The pond's proximity to a nearby housing development,
its known popularity as a recreational destination for local children, and
the enticing presence of floating log rafts upon its surface failed to sway
the court's judgment. Likewise, the increased risk of injury presented by
such natural features as the pond's murky waters, concealed depth,
sudden drop-off, and boggy shores was held an insufficient justification
for imposing a duty of care upon the landowner, as the court considered
such features common to waterways everywhere.69
While reaffirming the traditional policy reasons developed in
Barnhart, Smith, and Meyer, the Ochampaugh court further expanded the
rationale for exempting natural bodies of water from the attractive
nuisance doctrine by injecting several additional considerations into its
analysis. Following Ochampaugh, the justifications underlying
Washington's "natural bodies of water doctrine" can be conceptually
separated into six primary categories.
a. Lack ofForeseeable Harm
The first and most important reason for the watercourse exception to
liability under Washington's attractive nuisance doctrine is the
improbability that visitors will sustain injuries from ponds, lakes, and
streams.7" Ochampaugh repeatedly emphasized that the incidence of
"occasional" drownings remains rare relative to the extensive
recreational enjoyment afforded by natural bodies of water.71 Thus, as a
matter of law, the court has held that the foreseeability of harm from
natural watercourses is insufficient to warrant imposing a duty of
affirmative care upon the landowner.7'
b. Obviousness of Water's Inherent Danger
The Ochampaugh court also reiterated the general judicial consensus
regarding the open and obvious nature of water's inherent danger as a
further reason for insulating landowners from liability.73 Because the
hazards posed by streams and ponds are "apparent" and "easily
69. IR at 524, 588 P.2d at 1357.
70. Id. at 522-27, 588 P.2d at 1356-58.
71. Id.
72. Id at 527, 588 P.2d at 1358.
73. Id at 526-27, 588 P.2d at 1358.
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avoidable,"'74 imposing a duty upon the landowner to warn trespassing
children would constitute a duplicative and unnecessary safeguard.
Similarly, the court found reasonable the assumption that children too
young to recognize and appreciate such dangers would be protected by
their parents or other caretakers.'
c. Cost ofRendering Bodies of Water Safe for Children
An additional factor considered by the court was the
disproportionately severe financial burden such a duty of protection
would place upon landowners.76 Echoing the Restatement's concern
regarding the extreme cost of "improving land in a state of nature" for
the benefit of trespassers, Ochampaugh refused to apply the attractive
nuisance doctrine to such imposing natural conditions as bodies of
water.
77
d. Impracticality ofRendering Natural Bodies of Water Innocuous
The Ochampaugh court also recognized that watercourses could not
be effectively "childproofed" without undertaking the often enormous
task of draining, filling, or fencing them.78 Mandatiag such drastic
measures, reasoned the court, would not only impose a disproportionate
burden upon landowners, but would also effectively impede the practical
uses served by natural bodies of water.79 The court further noted that
eliminating the danger posed by streams and ponds on the landowner's
premises would not necessarily result in a commensurate increase in
child safety if other bodies of water remained nearby on neighboring
property."0
e. Loss ofRecreational Access and Aesthetic Value
Although the court had previously emphasized the recreational value
of natural watercourses to justify exempting them from the attractive
74. Id.
75. Id
76. IM at 523, 588 P.2d at 1356.
77. IM at 520, 588 P.2d at 1355 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 339 cmt. p (1965)).
78. Id. at 523, 588 P.2d at 1356.
79. Id at 526, 588 P.2d at 1358.
80. Id at 523, 588 P.2d at 1356.
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nuisance doctrine's reach,"' Ochampaugh reinforced this proposition by
taking judicial notice of Washington's recreational use statute." The
court interpreted this statute, which immunizes from liability landowners
who permit public recreational use to be made of their property without
extracting a fee, as expressing legislative intent to increase the amount of
land available for public outdoor recreational enjoyment.83 Further noting
that the statute had expressly disclaimed any intent to alter existing
attractive nuisance law, the court thus assumed the continued viability of
the judicially-created exemption for bodies of water." Likewise, while
Ochampaugh never explicitly recognized the visual impairment that
would necessarily result from the widespread fencing of Washington's
water bodies, such aesthetic concerns are implicit in the court's
extremely forceful dicta. 5
f Damage to Wildlife and Environmental Values
Ochampaugh also suggested, for the first time in Washington's
attractive nuisance jurisprudence, that a rule of liability implicitly forcing
landowners to destroy their natural waterways might result in
unacceptable environmental consequences.86 Although the court failed to
elaborate upon this point, its reasoning is largely self-explanatory: filling
or emplacing physical barriers around creeks and ponds would
dramatically impair wildlife access and severely hinder the myriad other
ecological functions served by natural bodies of water.8 7
III. THE DEGEL DECISION
On January 12, 1992, two-year-old Jason Farris sustained severe brain
damage after falling from a bicycle into a creek located on the premises
of the Majestic Mobile Manor mobile home park where his parents
81. See Barnhart v. Chicago, Minneapolis & St. Paul Ry. Co., 89 Wash. 304,307, 154 P. 441,442
(1916).
82. Ochampaugh, 91 Wash. 2d at 523, 588 P.2d at 1356 (noting Wash. Rev. Code. §§ 4.24.200-
.210).
83. Id. (citing John C. Barrett, Good Sports and Bad Lands: The Application of Washington's
Recreational Use Statute Limiting Landowner Liability, 53 Wash. L. Rev. 1 (1977)).
84. Id.
85. See supra note I and accompanying text.
86. Ochampaugh, 91 Wash. 2d at 523,588 P.2d at 1356.
87. See infra note 115.
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resided as tenants.38 The creek was situated approximalely twenty feet
from the perimeter road that surrounded the park's mobile units, and was
adjacent to a grassy play area commonly frequented by the park's
resident children. 9 A steep, slippery, wooded embankment bordered the
creek, and its waters underwent a seasonal transformation from "clear,
shallow, [and] slow-moving" during the summer to "deep, swift and
murky" in the winter months. 90 Families with young children were
required under the mobile home park's policy to live near the play area,
and thus near the creek, separated from families without children.9
Farris's father subsequently brought suit against the owner of the
mobile home park for negligence,92 alleging that this combination of
factors constituted an unreasonable hazard. Because tenants and their
children enjoyed business invitee status when using the common areas of
the landlord's rental premises,93 Farris argued that Majestic Mobile
Manor owed Jason, as an invitee, a duty of reasonable care to prevent
such accidents. In response, the landlord, relying on the natural bodies of
water exception and Ochampaugh's broad policy favoring water access,
argued that it had no duty to protect tenants from the dangers inherent in
a natural body of water.94 The trial court agreed with the landowner and
issued summary judgment against Farris.9'
On direct review, the Washington Supreme Court framed the
dispositive issue of the case as whether "a landowner [is] excused from
the duty to exercise reasonable care to protect invitees from potentially
dangerous conditions on the land solely because the danger is, in part,
due to risks which are inherent in a natural body of water."96 In essence,
88. Degel v. Majestic Mobile Manor, Inc., 129 Wash. 2d 43, 46-47, 914 P.2d 728, 729-30
(1996).
89. 111 at 46, 914 P.2d at 729-30.
90. Id
91. Id at 46, 914 P.2d at 730. The landlord also levied a $1.00 per day charge for each child. Id. at
46, 914 P.2d at 729.
92. The tort of negligence requires the plaintiff to prove four elements: (I) the existence of a duty;
(2) breach of that duty; (3) resulting injury; and (4) proximate cause. A legal duty is derived from
either statutory provisions or common law principles, and the issue of whether a particular duty
exists is a question of law. Id. at 48-49, 914 P.2d at 730.
93. Anderson v. Reeder, 42 Wash. 2d 45, 48, 253 P.2d 423, 425 (1953). For purposes of summary
judgment, the parties agreed-and the court assumed-that Jason Farris was an invitee at the time of
his accident. Degel, 129 Wash. 2d at 49, 914 P.2d at 731.
94. Degel, 129 Wash. 2d at 51, 914 P.2d at 732; Brief of Respondent at 1-5, Degel (No. 62312-1).
95. Degel, 129 Wash. 2d at 45, 914 P.2d at 729.
96. Id at48, 914 P.2d at 730.
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the question concerned whether or not the attractive nuisance doctrine's
exception for water bodies should apply to invitees.
Answering this question in the negative and remanding the case for
trial, the court expressly confined the natural bodies of water exception
to the attractive nuisance context. Under Degel, the traditional
justifications for exempting natural bodies of water from attractive
nuisance actions are inapplicable where the injured child holds invitee
rather than trespasser status.' The court explained that because an
invitee's entry is based upon an implied guarantee that the property has
been rendered safe, landowners are obligated to undertake the
precautions reasonably necessary to ensure the safety of these entrants."
Further, prior case law had enunciated the Restatement section 343A rule
in categorical terms,' which by its plain language permitted landowner
liability for reasonably anticipated harm to invitees from all open and
obvious dangers. This precedent seemingly precluded an exemption for
natural watercourses similar to that recognized in the attractive nuisance
arena.100 The Degel court thus focused its analysis on the entrant status of
the injured party rather than the specific nature of the dangerous
condition.
The Degel dissent raised two main arguments: first, that the liability
exception for natural waterways issued in Ochampaugh was applicable
regardless of the injured party's common law entrant status, and thus
constituted mandatory precedent for the present case absolving Majestic
Mobile Manor of any duty to warn or protect its invitees;101 and second,
that the public policy favoring access to natural bodies of water required
that landowners enjoy immunity from liability for visitors' water-related
injuries sustained while on the property.102 Both arguments are explored
further in Part IV.
97. I at 52-53, 914 P.2d at 733.
98. lit at 53, 914 P.2d at 733 (citing Jarr v. Seeco Constr. Co., 35 Wash. App. 324, 326, 666 P.2d
392, 394 (1983)); Tincani v. Inland Empire Zoological Soc'y, 124 Wash. 2d 121, 138-39, 875 P.2d
621, 631 (1994) ("[A]n invitee 'i...... entitled to expect that the possessor will exercise reasonable
care to make the land safe for his [or her] entry.") (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343
cmt. b (1965)).
99. Tincani, 124 Wash. 2d at 139, 875 P.2d at 631.
100. Degel, 129 Wash. 2d at 43, 914 P.2d at 731-32.
101. Id at 55-58, 914 P.2d at 734-35 (Durham, CJ., dissenting).
102. IM at 55, 914 P.2d at 734 (Durham, C.., dissenting).
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IV. DEGEL FAILS TO STRIKE THE APPROPRIATE ]3ALANCE
Although the Degel majority's ruling correctly interpreted existing
precedent and is consistent with the view of most other states, the
decision nevertheless remains problematic because it imposes upon
landowners an implicit duty to either fence or eliminate bodies of water
on their premises. Since these drastic remedial measures were previously
decried by the Ochampaugh court as violative of public: policy, Degel
establishes a precedent that potentially contradicts such policy concerns.
As such, the decision underscores the desirability of crafting a new rule
of liability that would better reconcile Ochampaugh's focus on
preserving waterfront access with Degel's interest in protecting
vulnerable invitee children from harm.
A. Degel Comports with the National Majority View and Existing
Washington Precedent
Degel is consistent with the view held by the majority of jurisdictions.
With few exceptions, national case law and legal conmentary have
rarely questioned the assumption that landowners owe their invitees a
duty of care to safeguard them from nearly all potentially dangerous
conditions upon the property, both natural and artificial."0 3
The Degel opinion also correctly interpreted existing Washington
precedent regarding a landowner's obligation to protect invitees from
natural dangers on the premises. Prior case law's recitation of the duty
created by Restatement sections 343 and 343A was stated in categorical
terms, and thus constituted controlling authority for the Degel court.'04
The court was similarly bound by the Mobile Home Lendlord-Tenant
Act, which imposes upon landlords an obligation to mai.Ltain the rental
property's common areas in a reasonably safe condition without creating
a specific exception for the hazards inherent in natural bodies of water.05
103. See Joseph A. Page, The Law of Premises Liability § 4.5, at 75 (2d ed. 1988); Annotation,
Liability of Landowner for Drowning of Child, 8 A.L.R.2d 1258, 1261, 1305 (1949). But see
Kinya v. Lifter, Inc., 489 So. 2d 92, 94-95 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (holding tlat landowners have
no duty to protect invitees from artificial bodies of water absent conditions .onstituting trap or
hidden danger); Casper v. Charles F. Smith & Son, Inc., 560 A.2d 1130, 1136-37 (Md. 1989)
(holding that, absent unusually dangerous features, bodies of water are open and obvious dangers for
which landowners owe no duty to warn and protect their invitees).
104. Tincani, 124 Wash. 2d at 138-39, 875 P.2d at 630-3 1.
105. Degel, 129 Wash. 2d at 49, 914 P.2d at 731 (citing Wash. Rev. Code § 59.20.130(2)-(4)).
Although the majority opinion omits any discussion of the Residential Landlord-Tenant Act, that
statute also mandates a similar duty of care as to the common areas of the landlord's rental premises.
See Wash. Rev. Code § 59.18.060 (1996).
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Thus, both case precedent and statutory authority supported the Degel
majority's ruling.
Likewise, the Degel court was not precedentially bound by
Ochampaugh's refusal to permit recovery for the drowning deaths of
trespassing children. Viewed from a purely legal perspective,
Ochampaugh held only that bodies of water fail to constitute "attractive
nuisances," and the court's forceful statement of public policy favoring
the preservation of access to waterfront areas ultimately remained mere
dicta. The Degel majority adopted this position, specifically limiting the
applicability of Ochampaugh's exemption for natural watercourses to
situations where the injured child is a trespasser. Under this
interpretation, Jason Farris's invitee status effectively precluded the
application of the "natural bodies of water doctrine" in his case, and
failed to alter Majestic Mobile Manor's duty of care to render the
premises safe for his protection."6
106. The dissenting opinion in Degel argued that Ochampaugh had implicitly recognized the
applicability of the natural water body exception to child invitees by exempting ponds and streams
from attractive nuisance liability. Degel, 129 Wash. 2d at 56-57, 914 P.2d at 734-35 (Durham, C.J.,
dissenting). Drawing upon the traditional "implied invitation" theory of attractive nuisance, a
historic legal fiction under which trespassing children meeting the doctrine's criteria were
transformed into "invitees" to whom the landowner owed an increased obligation of warning and
protection, the dissent posited that the attractive nuisance doctrine elevates the entrant status of
trespassing children to that of invitees. Id. at 56, 914 P.2d at 734 (Durham, C.J., dissenting); see also
United Zinc & Chem. Co. v. Britt, 258 U.S. 268, 275 (1922) (recognizing "implied invitation"
theory). Thus, because Ochampaugh and Barnhart held that landowners owe no affirmative duty to
such fictional "invitees" with respect to water hazards, the dissent argued that this exemption was
equally applicable to all "true" invitees. Degel, 129 Wash. 2d at 55- 61, 914 P.2d at 734-37
(Durham, CJ., dissenting). Read in this way, Ochampaugh would have dictated a contrary result in
Degel.
The Degel majority cursorily dismissed this novel interpretation, responding simply that "a child
invitee is not the equivalent of the trespasser in an attractive nuisance action but is a guest,
specifically invited upon the property of the landowner." Idl at 53, 914 P.2d at 733. Although legally
correct, the majority's response remains unsatisfactory, as it fails to explain why landowners owe no
heightened duty to social guests who are likewise "specifically invited" onto the owner's property.
See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text. Nevertheless, the dissent's argument ultimately fails
because it rests upon the faulty assumption that landowners owe a duty of care to trespassing
children under the attractive nuisance doctrine that is functionally equivalent to the duty owed to
invitees.
While superficially identical, a closer examination of these respective duties reveals crucial
differences regarding both the scope of the obligation and the circumstances under which it is
triggered. Unlike the general, all-encompassing duty of care mandated by the Restatement's invitee
provisions, Washington's attractive nuisance doctrine imposes its limited obligation upon
landowners only when the doctrine's five elements have been established. See supra text
accompanying note 25. As a result, while the attractive nuisance doctrine requires landowners to
safeguard children only from conditions likely to injure them, Restatement § 343A imposes its duty
of care whenever landowners should anticipate harm to their invitees, regardless of the probability of
such accidents actually occurring. See supra text accompanying note 14. Similarly, attractive
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B. Degel Inherently Contradicts Ochampaugh's Policy qfPreserving
Access to Washington's Waterways
The key assumption underlying the Degel majority's holding was its
assertion that "[t]he reasons for exempting the landowner from liability
in attractive nuisance cases do not exist where the injured party is an
invitee, rather than a trespassing child."' 7 From a purely technical
perspective, the court's statement is correct: because natural bodies of
water do not present a significant probability of injury' ° and cannot
usually be rendered harmless without obstructing the practical purposes
they serve,"° they fail to satisfy the first and fifth elements of
Washington's attractive nuisance doctrine.' Viewed in this light, the
fact that landowners incur no liability for water bodies under the doctrine
could be seen as merely a failure to meet the doctrine's criteria rather
than a specific judicially-created exception to the general rule of
attractive nuisance."'
nuisance liability attaches only when the dangerous condition could have been rendered innocuous
in a reasonably practicable and feasible manner without obstructing any reasonable purpose for
which it was intended; in contrast, a landowner's duty under the Restatement to safeguard the
premises for the benefit of invitees is stated in categorical terms and without reference to either
practical feasibility or preserving the dangerous condition's useful function. See supra text
accompanying notes 13-14.
The few jurisdictions to have specifically addressed the issue remain divided. Compare Cotter v.
Novak, 261 P.2d 827, 828 (N.M. 1953) (finding no substantial difference between duty of landowner
maintaining attractive nuisance on premises and duty of trailer park operator to child invitees), with
Jones v. Billings, 289 A.2d 39, 42-43 (Me. 1972) (holding that limited duty of care owed under
Restatement's attractive nuisance doctrine was not equivalent to landowner's general obligation to
"exercise ordinary care to keep the premises safe" for business invitees). Of these two positions,
however, the better and most prevalent view holds that the extent of a landowner's duty of
reasonable care and the circumstances under which it is triggered rzmain significantly
distinguishable for the respective entrants at issue. See, e.g., Jones, 289 A.2d at 42. The court stated:
It is apparent that the Restatement Rule was very carefully stated so as to limit the duty owed by
the possessors of property to trespassing children to specific and well defined situations. It was
not to be equated with the obligation "to exercise ordinary care to keep the pr-mises reasonably
safe" since it applies only to conditions "which involve an unreasonable risk of death or serious
bodily harm."
Id. (quoting Restatement (Second) Torts § 343A (1965)).
107. Degel, 129 Wash. 2d at 52-53, 914 P.2d at 733.
108. See supra text accompanying notes 70-72.
109. See supra text accompanying notes 78-79.
110. The first and fifth criteria of liability under Washington's attractive nuisance doctrine are,
respectively, the probability of injury resulting from the dangerous condition at issue, and the ability
to prevent access to or feasibly render the condition safe without obstructing any reasonable use for
which it was intended. See supra text accompanying note 25.
111. This explanation is appealing particularly in light of the Washington Supreme Court's oft-
stated policy of limiting rather than extending the doctrine's application. See, e.g., Holland v. Niemi,
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This interpretation, however, ignores the strong public policy
justifications supporting the doctrine's exemption for natural bodies of
water. Water's unique dangers, physical characteristics, and social
benefits conceptually distinguish it from other natural conditions that
similarly fail to meet the technical criteria of attractive nuisance
liability."t 2 Further, by incorporating recreational, environmental, and
wildlife values into its analytical framework," 3 the Ochampaugh court
significantly broadened the policy foundation underlying the natural
bodies of water exception, and thereby implicitly expanded the
exception's logical scope beyond the attractive nuisance sphere.
1. The Policy Justifications Underlying the Natural Bodies of Water
Exception are Equally Applicable to the Invitee Context
Much of the judicially-recognized rationale for exempting landowners
from liability for harm caused to trespassing children by streams and
ponds is logically extendible to situations where the injured party is an
invitee. Because the consequences of imposing an implicit duty of care
upon landowners to fence or fill their watercourses would occur
regardless of the particular class of visitors sought to be protected,
Ochampaugh's concerns regarding the financial costs to landowners, the
loss of recreational access, and the significant environmental damage that
would result from such a scenario retain their validity across the entire
entrant status spectrum.
a. Recreational and Visual Access, Damage to Ecological and
Wildlife Values, and Financial Costs
First, the importance of public recreational access central to the
attractive nuisance doctrine's exemption for waterways is conceptually
55 Wash. 2d 85, 89, 345 P.2d 1106, 1109 (1959); Mail v. M.R. Smith Lumber, 47 Wash. 2d 447,
449-50, 287 P.2d 877, 878 (1955). From this perspective, the court's refusal to include natural
bodies of water within the general umbrella of attractive nuisance liability arguably stems more from
the general judicial reluctance to extend the doctrine's reach than from a specific desire to exempt
streams, lakes, and ponds.
112. Trees, for example, have traditionally been exempted from the attractive nuisance doctrine
despite their often injurious effect on children attracted to them. See, e.g., Mullins v. Pannell, 266
So. 2d 862, 864 (Ala. 1972). Unlike injuries from playing near water, however, the danger posed by
climbing up trees can effectively be prevented by landowners removing low-hanging limbs. Further,
while trees and similar natural objects may serve important ecological and socially valuable
purposes, their recreational and environmental value has not enjoyed water's explicit and forceful
recognition by the Washington judiciary to justify their exemption from attractive nuisance liability.
113. Ochampaugh v. City of Seattle, 91 Wash. 2d 514,523, 588 P.2d 1351, 1356 (1979).
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extendible to the business invitee realm. In the landlord/tenant context,
for example, waterfront property and water views are highly desirable
and command heightened rental costs. Many of the tenants who choose
to pay such increased prices clearly do so for the purpose of enjoying the
physical and visual access to the adjacent water body. Because
exculpatory agreements absolving landlords from liability for tenant
injuries sustained in the common areas of rental premises are
unenforceable under Washington law,"' landlords desiring to avoid
liability would be forced to impede tenant access to wate:front areas on
their property. Imposing upon landlords a duty that would ultimately
result in erecting fences around scenic lakes and rivers would
significantly impair the aesthetic and recreational benefits currently
valued by tenants, adversely affecting not only the landlord's interest,
but also that of the invitees. Ochampaugh's policy of ensuring public
access to water should not only benefit trespassers and landowners who
decline to invite visitors onto their property, but should also logically
encompass invitees and the landowners who encourage their presence.
Second, because the potential environmental and wildlife damage
resulting from the destruction of water bodies would occur regardless of
the injured visitor's entrant status, Ochampaugh's warning in this regard
also retains its validity in the invitee context."5 While the environmental
value of most property designated for business purposes may arguably be
less than that of relatively undeveloped land," 6 Ochanpaugh's con-
sideration of ecological concerns was issued without regard to the type of
land involved or the common law status of the entrant." 7
Third, Ochampaugh acknowledged that a rule of liability that would
effectively require landowners to take the precautionary measures
necessary to prevent trespassing children from water-related injuries
114. MeCutcheon v. United Homes Corp., 79 Wash. 2d 443,486 P.2d 1093 (1971).
115. Ochampaugh specifically addressed only the environmental and wildlife detriment resulting
from a landowner's decision to "destroy" his or her ponds and lakes. Ochampaugh, 91 Wash. 2d at
523, 588 P.2d at 1356. The import of this warning, however, would also logically extend to
situations where bodies of water were surrounded by childproof fences rather than being drained or
filled. The emplacement of fences around water bodies, for example, would completely prevent
wildlife access to water for any animal unable to climb over the fence. See, e.g., Kimberly Hills
Neighborhood Ass'n v. Dion, 320 N.W.2d 668, 677 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982) (noting that "fences
interfere with the free movement of wildlife in the area").
116. Arguably, however, the fact that a natural body of water is located on business property
potentially increases rather than diminishes its ecological value, as it becomes a biologically rich
island in the larger sea of surrounding development.
117. Ochampaugh, 91 Wash. 2d at 523, 588 P.2d at 1356.
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would result in an inordinate financial burden. 8 In light of the numerous
other policy reasons against fencing or destroying waterways, the large
number of businesses in Washington State possessing or abutting natural
bodies of water validates the Degel dissent's argument that the cost to
landowners of effectively protecting their business guests from water
hazards would constitute a similarly unreasonable onus.'19 Further,
although the profit a landowner receives from business invitees would
help alleviate this financial burden, extending this rationale to public
invitees from whom the owner derives no financial benefit presents
obvious logical difficulties. 20
b. Water Is an Open and Obvious Danger Requiring No Additional
Warning
Water has long enjoyed judicial recognition as an "open and obvious
danger," the hazards of which are normally apparent to all children old
enough to be at large.' Along with fire and falling from heights, water
118. Id.
119. Degel v. Majestic Mobile Manor, Inc., 129 Wash. 2d 43, 58, 914 P.2d 728, 735 (1996)
(Durham, CJ., dissenting) ("To expect that landowners can somehow make these waters safe for
children at anything less than an extraordinary cost is to misunderstand the magnitude of the
burden."). Degel held that a landowner's burden to safeguard waterways is not disproportionately
heavy as a matter of law, where the landowner profits from the invitee's presence or where it has
been encouraged. L at 53, 914 P.2d at 733. Thus, a possible counter-argument could be that a key
element in the Ochampaugh court's refusal to saddle landowners with the burden of childproofing
bodies of water was that such landowners were "strangers" to the trespassing children. Ochampaugh,
91 Wash. 2d at 522, 588 P.2d at 1356. This rationale carries significantly less persuasive value when
a business owner actually invites an entrant onto the premises, as the owner loses his or her
"stranger" status in such situations. However, landowners are presumably not "strangers" to their
invited social guests either, yet are not required to take such drastic precautionary measures for the
benefit of these entrants.
120. Public invitees are entrants who have responded to a landowner's express or implied public
invitation to visit the owner's property. See supra notes 12-14. Landowners who issue such a public
invitation for the purpose of outdoor recreation remain insulated from liability by Washington's
recreational use statute. See Wash. Rev. Code §§ 4.24.200-.210 (1996). However, if the public
invitation is made for purposes other than outdoor recreation, landowners presumably remain liable
under Degel to responding entrants who are injured by natural bodies of water on the premises.
121. See, e.g., Locke v. Liquid Air Corp., 725 F.2d 1331, 1334 (11th Cir. 1984); Scott v. Future
Invs. of Miami, Inc., 559 So. 2d 726, 727 (Fl. Dist. Ct App. 1990); Saga Bay Property Owners
Ass'n v. Askew, 513 So. 2d 691, 692 (Fl. Dist Ct. App. 1987); Cope v. Doe, 464 N.E.2d 1023,
1026-27 (Ill. 1984); Yacoub v. Chicago Park Dist, 618 N.E.2d 685, 688 (1L App. CL 1993);
Lerma v. Rockford Blacktop Constr. Co., 617 N.E.2d 531, 538 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993); Stevens v. Riley,
580 N.E.2d 160, 164-65 (Il. App. Ct 1991); Casper v. Charles F. Smith & Son, Inc., 560 A.2d
1130, 1134-35 (Md. 1989); Waters v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 369 N.W.2d 755, 758
(Wis. Ct. App. 1985); see also Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 339 cmt.j (1965).
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is one of the first perils recognizable to children.' Because of their
unique physical characteristics and inherent dangers,"z bodies of water
have thus "historically and consistently been afforded distinctive
treatment in the law relating to landowners' liability."' 4 Ochampaugh
echoed this view by insisting that despite water's dangerous potential,
water-related injuries remain insufficiently foreseeable as a matter of law
to impose liability upon landowners."z
Since water "signal[s] its own lethal danger," '26 requiring landowners
to warn their invitees of the hazards associated with lakes and streams
would constitute a redundant, expensive, and largely ineffective
precaution while producing only a minimal net increase in child safety.
Older invitees choosing to ignore the perils of streams and lakes would
also likely remain undeterred by posted warning signs, and infants too
young to appreciate water's inherent danger would necessarily be
incapable of reading or understanding any written warning.'27 Thus,
122. See, e.g., Riley v. Brasunas, 438 S.E.2d 113, 115 (Ga. Ct App. J993) ("The dangers
associated with... water are... normally understood by young children absent other factors
creating additional risks of harm."); Higginbotham v. Winbom, 218 S.E.2d 917, 921 (Ga. Ct. App.
1975) ("[E]ven young children have a natural fear of water, fire and heights."); see also Davis, supra
note 34, at 124 ("[T]he peril inherent in water, is, like fire, obvious to a child, or instinctively
known.").
123. See, e.g., Lerma, 617 N.E.2d at 538 (noting that, unlike other dangerous natural conditions,
any body of water categorically represents potentially lethal hazard).
124. Casper, 560 A.2d at 1134-35.
125. Ochampaugh v. City of Seattle, 91 Wash. 2d 514, 527, 588 P.2d 1351, 1358 (1979).
Significantly, Ochampaugh's recognition regarding the low probability of harm from water bodies
arose in a context where the presence of trespassing children at the pond was both constant and
known. Id. at 516, 523, 588 P.2d at 1353, 1356. As such, the issue of foreseeability would logically
remain the same in situations where invitee children were known to congregate near a particular
watercourse, such as the mobile home park in Degel.
126. Casper, 560 A.2d at 1137.
127. A strong case in point here is Degel itself: Jason Farris's parents were aware of the obvious
danger posed by Clark's Creek, and accordingly prohibited their children frhm playing near the
creek unattended. Degel v. Majestic Mobile Manor, Inc., 129 Wash. 2d 43, 47, 914 P.2d 728, 730
(1996). Jason's tragic accident occurred during a brief but admitted lapse in parental supervision. Id.
In light of the fact that the creek's danger was already known to Jason's parents, and that Jason
himself was too young to have appreciated a written warning had one been posted, it is difficult to
envision what value if any the presence of additional warning signs would have had in the instant
case. Ultimately, the existence of such a warning would merely have had the duplicative effect of
informing the Farrises of what they already knew: that a creek was located on te premises, and that
it presented a potential risk of injury to their children.
Some commentators have suggested that the large number of drownings infers an inability of
children to appreciate the dangers posed by water. See, e.g., Prosser, supra note 26, at 458; Note,
Landowner's Liability for Infant Drowning in Artificial Pond, 26 Ind. L-. 266, 271 (1951).
However, at least with respect to post-toddler children, the better view is thtt children recognize
water's danger but willingly choose to disregard it. See supra notes 121-22.
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unless physical access to the waterfront were prevented by way of a
fence, barricade, or omnipresent sentry, the only method of truly
safeguarding invitee children would be to ensure the sufficiency of their
parental supervision. The Washington Supreme Court's recognition of
this principle in the attractive nuisance context12 is therefore logically
extendible to the invitee realm.
c. Invitees Would Continue to Incur Injuries Despite the Presence of
Physical Barriers
Jurisdictions that have considered the issue have almost universally
acknowledged that the only truly effective means of "childproofing"
bodies of water for the purpose of avoiding liability is to either surround
them with fences or to drain and fill them. 129 As previously explained,
however, such measures are economically prohibitive, unduly
burdensome, and inherently violative of the public policy favoring
recreational, visual, and wildlife access to the state's watercourses.
Significantly, however, even the widespread emplacement of fences
would fail to guarantee the safety of invitee children. Courts have
repeatedly recognized the impossibility of effectively barricading
waterways, 3° and the massive number of cases involving children who
have incurred injury despite the presence of fences or other barricades
belies the assertion that physical barriers represent a panacea for the
problem of child access to dangerous conditions on the premises131
128. See Meyer v. General Elec. Co., 46 Wash. 2d 251, 254, 280 P.2d 257, 259 (1955) (noting
that with regard to water, "the presence of danger to an unattended infant is not necessarily a test of
anything but the need of parental care").
129. See, e.g., Scott v. Future Invs. of Miami, Inc., 559 So. 2d 726, 727 (Fla. Dist. CL App. 1990);
Saga Bay Property Owners Ass'n v. Askew, 513 So. 2d 691, 692-93 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987);
Walters v. Greenglade Villas Homeowners Ass'n, 399 So. 2d 538, 539 (Fla. Dist Ct. App. 1981);
Adams v. Brookwood Country Club, 148 N.E.2d 39, 43 (11. App. Ct. 1958); Ochampaugh, 91
Wash. 2d at 523,588 P.2d at 1356; Emond v. Kimberly-Clark Co., 149 N.W. 760,761 (Wis. 1914).
130. See Emond, 149 N.W. at 761 (recognizing that "to construct a boy-proof fence at a
reasonable cost would tax the inventive genius of an Edison"); see also Kelly v. Benas, 116 S.W.
557, 560 (Mo. 1909) ("Shall [landowners] fence [their waterfronts] against adventurous, trespassing
boys? Almost as well suggest 'that [they] build a wall against birds."); Washabaugh v. Northern Va.
Constr. Co., 48 S.E.2d 276, 278 (Va. 1948) (stating that to prevent adventurous children from
gaining access to bodies of water "would take more than a mere warning sign, fence, or any ordinary
barricade"); Comment, Torts-Attractive Nuisance Doctrine-Application to Bodies of Water,
4 Vand. L. Rev. 198, 200 n.22 (1950) (noting that with regard to bodies of water on owner's
property, "a fence is a slight deterrence in keeping an active boy from trespassing').
131. Case law is replete with examples of children passing over, under, and through physical
barriers in order to reach prohibited areas. See, e.g., Smith v. U.S. Steel Corp., 351 So. 2d 1369 (Ala.
1977) (thirteen-year-old boys drowned in reservoir after climbing eight-foot cyclone fence topped
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Similarly, the existence of additional water bodies or stream segments
located on neighboring property minimizes the net increase in child
safety resulting from a landowner's decision to fence the waterfront.
1 32
The unfortunate but unmistakable lesson to be drawn from these
realizations is clear: children determined to visit natural bodies of water
will continue to do so despite the emplacement of preventive devices,
and thus will inevitably continue to sustain injuries.
The recognition that invitee children (at least those old enough to
climb fences) will almost certainly continue to incur harm despite the
presence of physical barriers, coupled with the low probability of
drowning even when children do gain access to water, casts serious
doubt upon the social value of imposing liability on landowners for most
water-related injuries. Viewed in light of the foregoing, the problem is
that the duty of care established in Degel-ostensibly in furtherance of
the dual public policies of ensuring a stable business climate and
protecting children-will result in few tangible benefits (in terms of lives
saved) relative to the significant detriment such a rule would pose to the
countervailing public policy of preserving access to water. The minimal
increase in child safety resulting from a landowner's decision to fence
the waterfront is ultimately outweighed by the corresponding detriment
to this public policy concern.
d. Natural Bodies of Water are Distinguishable from Other Natural
Dangers and Warrant an Exemption from the General Duty of Care
The Washington judiciary's past willingness to expand a landowner's
duty of care to cover other natural conditions has, in part, stemmed from
its recognition that setting apart such conditions for selective treatment
with barbed wire); Phachansiri v. City of Lowell, 623 N.E.2d 1124 (Mass. App. Ct. 1993) (five-year-
old was injured and seven-year-old drowned in swimming pool after digging hole underneath ten-
foot chain link fence with two-foot barbed wire top); Latimer v. City of Clovis, 495 P.2d 788 (N.M.
Ct. App. 1972) (five-year-old was injured in swimming pool after passing through hole in fence).
132. See Ochampaugh, 91 Wash. 2d at 523, 588 P.2d at 1356 (noting that even though pond had
been filled, danger of drowning had not been significantly alleviated due to presence of other water
bodies remaining in immediate vicinity). This observation is not meant to su:ggest that the standard
of care should be reduced to the lowest common denominator, but rather that the Degel majority
failed to adequately consider Ochampaugh's recognition that requiring preventive measures by one
landowner does not necessarily result in the desired increase in lives saved. Given the numerous
public policy arguments against fencing or filling bodies of water and the fact that the incidence of
drowning remains low relative to use, the court should have considered more carefully the extremely
limited benefit, previously acknowledged by the court, of imposing such a dut of care.
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would be "to create a distinction without a sound difference."'3 While
this reasoning is valid as to such easily rectified natural dangers as
accumulations of ice and snow, its underlying rationale is inapplicable
when considered within the context of natural bodies of water. Water's
recreational, aesthetic, and ecological values effectively distinguish it
from other less socially-valuable natural conditions. Further, unlike ice,
snow, protruding tree roots, and small holes in the ground, water bodies
typically cannot be rendered safe absent inordinate financial expenditure
by the landowner.
e. Limiting the Natural Bodies of Water Exception to the Trespasser
Arena Will Severely Dilute Its Underlying Policy
Finally, applying disparate standards of care with respect to bodies of
water (one for trespassing children and one for business invitees) as
established by Degel would lead to inconsistent and illogical results that
would effectively emasculate Ochampaugh's policy of preserving intact
waterways and access to them. A business owner anticipating the
presence of trespassing children at a pond located upon the premises
would have no duty to prevent access for their benefit, but would
nevertheless be forced to barricade or fill the pond in order to prevent
injury to his or her invitees. Because most entrants onto business
property are presumably invitees rather than trespassers, a public policy
exemption absolving landowners from liability for trespassers' injuries
would be rendered effectively meaningless by the simultaneous existence
of a duty to take precautionary measures for the benefit of other entrants.
The ultimate result would thus be a fenced or destroyed body of water,
an eventuality that would contradict the environmental, recreational, and
economic policy concerns previously enunciated by OchampaughY4
133. See Geise v. Lee, 84 Wash. 2d 866, 869, 529 P.2d 1054, 1056 (1975) (imposing duty upon
landlords to remove natural accumulations of ice and snow from common areas of rental premises
due in part to absence of sound reason for granting distinctive treatment to ice and snow).
134. The tripartite nature of premises liability law admittedly creates numerous occasions where
landowners must take affirmative steps to protect invitees that need not be taken to protect licensees
and trespassers. Unlike situations involving other dangerous conditions, however, the court has
already acknowledged the strong public policy favoring intact and unfenced waterways. This judicial
recognition underscores the unique benefits of water access, and suggests the desirability of




2. The Duty of Care Imposed by Degel Inherently Conflicts with the
Public Policy Favoring Unfenced Waterways
The central issue in Degel was whether a landowner's duty of care to
invitees should encompass an affirmative obligation to protect them from
the dangers presented by natural bodies of water. In determining the
existence of a duty, the court was required by previous case law to
evaluate the relevant public policy considerations implicated by the
case.' Through its mechanical application of the Restatement section
343A standard, the Degel majority afforded insufficient weight to the
countervailing public policy favoring access to water bodies, and
regrettably disregarded the logical consequences of imposing an implicit
duty upon landowners to fence or fill their waterways.
While the Washington judiciary's adoption of Restatement section
343A serves the important public policies of ensuring a safe business
environment and protecting invitees from injury, strictly applying this
rule to natural bodies of water will expose landowners to increased
liability for the presence of streams, lakes, and rivers located on their
premises. As Barnhart, Ochampaugh, and the Degel dissent noted, the
combination of water's alluring nature and inherent danger will
inevitably result in occasional water-related injuries. That landowners
possessing bodies of water may thus "anticipate" physical harm to their
invitees absent an effective means of preventing physical access to the
water therefore potentially exposes such owners to vulnerability to
section 343A claims.
136
Although the practical effect of this liability threat may ultimately fail
to assume the apocalyptic dimensions envisioned by the Degel dissent,1
37
landowners will nevertheless feel the weight of its shadow. Since the
question of whether or not a landowner should have anticipated harm
under section 343A almost always necessitates a factual determination,
138
135. See Bemethy v. Walt Failor's, Inc., 97 Wash. 2d 929, 933, 653 P.2d 280, 282 (1982);
Swanson v. McKain, 59 Wash. App. 303, 307, 796 P.2d 1291, 1293 (1990).
136. Degel v. Majestic Mobile Manor, Inc., 129 Wash. 2d 43, 61, 914 P.2d 728, 737 (1996)
(Durham, C.J., dissenting); see also Casper v. Charles F. Smith & Son, Inc., 526 A.2d 87, 94 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 1987) ("All bodies of water deep enough to drown a child and situated within roving
distance of children, present a danger from which an injury or death to some child may reasonably be
anticipated."), aff'd, 560 A.2d 1130 (Md. 1989).
137. Degel, 129 Wash. 2d at 55, 914 P.2d at 734 (Durham, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that "the
majority creates a universe in which our precious natural resources will be barricaded from public
access").
138. See, e.g., id. at 54, 914 P.2d at 734 (holding issue of whether Majestic Mobile Manor should
have anticipated Jason Farris's injury to be jury question).
1164
Vel. 72:1139, 1997
Landowner Liability for Natural Bodies of Water
owners choosing to leave ponds and streams in their natural state will at
a minimum incur increased legal expenses for resulting accidents,
regardless of a jury's ultimate disposition regarding liability. Thus,
because the only truly effective methods of preventing invitee injury
from bodies of water on the premises are to destroy or barricade them
from physical access, landowners must choose between exposing
themselves to liability and violating the public policy favoring water
access issued by Ochampaugh.
Therefore, despite the near-consensus of judicial opinion requiring
landowners to protect their invitees from all dangerous conditions on the
property, numerous policy reasons suggest the desirability of creating a
limited exception to this duty of care which would relax the obligation of
landowners to warn and protect invitees from the dangers inherent in
natural bodies of water.
V. THE INHERENT CONFLICT BETWEEN DEGEL AND
OCHAMPA UGH WARRANTS A SOLUTION THAT
SIMULTANEOUSLY PROTECTS VULNERABLE
ENTRANTS AND PRESERVES WATER ACCESS
An ideal approach to the problem presented by Degel would seek to
balance the competing public policies implicated in the case: minimizing
injury to vulnerable invitees on one hand, and ensuring the continued
recreational, visual, and environmental benefits derived from
unbarricaded lakes and rivers on the other. In striking this balance, the
recognition that invitee children will continue to sustain water-related
injuries despite the presence of physical barriers'39 suggests the
appropriateness of erring, if at all, on the side of preserving water access.
Instead of the blanket exemption for water-related injury liability
proposed by the landowner and the dissent in Degel, the better-reasoned
approach would recognize a carefully-limited exception to the general
rule of section 343A for natural bodies of water that would permit the
imposition of liability under only a few specific circumstances.
Borrowing from the attractive nuisance doctrine's exemption for water,
landowners under this suggested rule would retain their original duty to
warn and protect invitees from any traps or other unusually dangerous
and deceptive conditions not typically associated with natural bodies of
139. See supra notes 130-32 (noting likelihood of injury to children despite presence of physical
barriers).
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water. 4 Further, and most importantly, owners would remain under a
duty of reasonable care to safeguard extremely young invitees too
immature to appreciate water's inherent danger whenever such infants
are likely to be near the water body unattended by their parents or other
guardians.1
41
The latter provision would not necessarily impose liability upon
landowners for infant drownings, but would rather leave as a jury
question whether the owners should have anticipated the presence of
unsupervised infants near the waterfront, and if so, whether they failed to
implement reasonable safeguards. In such cases, landlords could
minimize their potential exposure to liability by taking affirmative steps
to distance infant invitees from bodies of water located on the
property, 42 by enclosing designated play areas with fences, and by
employing other similar measures falling short of destroying or
barricading the water body itself. Further, the suggested approach would
preclude most retail and business park owners from incurring liability for
water-related injuries to their invitees, because such owners could not
normally anticipate the entry of infants onto the prerrises without the
supervising presence of their parents. Thus, with careful planning, even
business owners with infant invitees could potentially avoid the fear of
140. Given the redundancy, ineffectiveness, and burden of requiring landowners to warn entrants
of open and obvious dangers, the suggested approach would not impose such a duty absent the
presence of deceptive or unusual features associated with the watercourse. See supra notes 126-28
and accompanying text.
141. The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 339 recognizes a similar distinction in the trespasser
arena between extremely young infants and older children. The result is a caveat to the usual rule of
exempting bodies of water from liability under the attractive nuisance doctrine when the landowner
has reason to expect the presence of trespassing children too young to recognize the hazards posed
by water. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 339 cmt. j, illus. 7 (1965). Defining the exact age
threshold that would trigger a landowner's duty of affirmative care under this suggested approach is
beyond the scope of this Note. Presumably, however, the acknowledged capacity of post-toddler
children to recognize water's inherent danger, as well as the proven capability of such children to
scale physical barriers, suggest that the age limit should be much more restricted than that required
to satisfy the "tender years" criteria of the attractive nuisance doctrine. A leading commentator has
noted the inability of an -"infant of three or four" to appreciate water's risks, implying that an
appropriate age limit might be five years. Prosser, supra note 26, at 458. Similarly, given the
inherent vulnerability of mentally and physically disabled adults, the proposed rule would also
encompass such entrants whenever landowners should anticipate their unsupervised presence near
the property's waterfront.
142. Of course, merely increasing the probable distance between young infants and bodies of
water fails to ultimately guarantee their safety. See, e.g., Villani v. Wilmington Hous. Auth., 106
A.2d 211 (Del. Super. Ct. 1954) (thirty-month-old infant drowned in stream ocated approximately
one-quarter mile away from landlord's property); Meyer v. General Elec. Co., 46 Wash. 2d 251,280
P.2d 257 (1955) (thirty-month-old infant drowned in drainage ditch after wandering over 2000 feet
from his house).
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liability and, as a result, would not feel compelled to fence or fill their
natural watercourses.
Under this approach, landowners would ordinarily owe no duty to
warn or protect invitees old enough to independently recognize the
dangers inherent in natural bodies of water. The judicial consensus that
the hazards of water should reasonably be understood and appreciated
"by any child of an age to be allowed at large"'43 is logically extendible
beyond the attractive nuisance realm and should therefore apply with
equal force to invitees and licensees.
The application of this suggested framework to the factual situation
involved in Degel would have imposed a duty of reasonable care upon
Majestic Mobile Manor to distance child tenants such as three-year-old
Jason Farris from the dangers presented by Clark's Creek. Liability on
the basis of the creek's steep banks and forceful current would be
precluded since such natural features represent open and obvious dangers
and are common to watercourses everywhere.'" However, the known
presence of extremely young child invitees on the premises would suffice
to require the landowner to reasonably protect such children, and would
mandate affirmative steps to ensure that unsupervised recreational areas
be located a safe distance away from the waterfront. Had Majestic
Mobile Manor's housing policy not required families with young
children to live closest to the waterfront, and had the play area itself
either been fenced or located farther from the creek, the foreseeability of
injury would have been minimal and would almost certainly have
resulted in a jury verdict of nonliability under the proposed rule.
In addition to the public policy reasons favoring extension of the
natural bodies of water exception to the invitee sphere, several factors
underscore the logic of such a rule. First, the attractive nuisance doctrine
itself is not limited to situations involving trespassing children but
applies with equal force to licensee and invitee children.'45 Although the
doctrine's parameters serve as a floor, rather than a ceiling, regarding the
duty owed to the latter entrant categories, its extension into the invitee
realm provides a conceptual basis for similarly applying the doctrine's
natural bodies of water exception to situations where the injured child is
a business visitor.
143. See, e.g., Ochampaugh v. City of Seattle, 91 Wash. 2d 514, 520,588 P.2d 1351, 1355 (1979)
(citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 339 cmt.j).
144. See supra notes 41-46 and accompanying text.
145. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 343B cmts. b, c.
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Second, the suggested approach attempts to reconcile the principle
that parents ultimately bear the primary responsibility for protecting
children from water hazards,146 with the generally recognized public
policy of protecting infants too immature to appreciate such dangers and
protect themselves.147 The resulting duty of care fills the gap between
reasonably anticipated parental supervision and unsupervised child
recreation by threatening liability against landowners only when they
should reasonably foresee the presence of unattended infant invitees near
the premises' waterfront.
Third, the proposed rule represents a superior alternative to other
jurisdictions' attempts to address the waterfront liability issue. For
example, a small minority of cases have apparently attempted to insulate
landowners from liability for water-related injuries by entirely
eliminating any duty of care to protect entrants regardless of age or
common law status, provided that no hidden or unique hazards are
present. 41 This approach remains unsatisfactory in light of the oft-cited
countervailing public policy favoring the protection of extremely young
children too immature to appreciate water's inherent danger. Similarly
problematic is the Degel defendant's proposed rule, 49 which would
retain the general framework of Restatement section 343A but establish a
limited exception for conditions, including water bodies, so obviously
dangerous that the possessing landowner should riot reasonably
anticipate injuries to invitees as a matter of law.' The underlying
rationale of this model remains unrealistic when considered within the
context of natural bodies of water; despite the obviousness of water's
danger and the fact that it is one of the first perils recognizable to
146. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
147. See, e.g., supra note 24 (discussing "tender years" doctrine), and text accompanying note 53
(noting exception to attractive nuisance doctrine's general exception for bodies of water when
landowner should anticipate presence of extremely young trespassing infants nex waterfront).
148. See, e.g., Chaconas v. United States, No. 84-1492, 780 F.2d 1020, 1985 V'L 13925, at *1-2
(6th Cir. 1985); Navarro v. Country Village Homeowners' Ass'n, 654 So. 2d 16" (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1995); Kinya v. Lifter, Inc., 489 So. 2d 92 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986); Roberson v. City of Kinston,
134 S.E.2d 193 (N.C. 1964); Fitch v. Selwyn Village, Inc., 68 S.E.2d 255 (N C. 1951). A similar
blanket exemption for water-related injury has also been legislatively attempted. See, e.g., Note,
Liability Resultingfrom Artificial Bodies of Water, 48 Iowa L. Rev. 939, 952-53 (1963) (discussing
proposed legislation that would have insulated Iowa landowners from liability for any injury or death
caused by bodies of water located on premises).
149. Brief ofRespondent at 22, Degel (No. 62312-1).
150. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Hollerich, 394 N.W.2d 853, 856 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that
steep hill on landowner's premises presented such obvious danger that owner was not required to
warn or protect invitee under § 343A as matter of law).
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infants,'5 the enormous number of cases involving drowned children
negates any assertion that water-related injury to invitees should never be
anticipated.'52 The suggested approach openly acknowledges the
continued inevitability of harm, but also maintains a duty of protection
for the benefit of inherently vulnerable entrants.
VI. CONCLUSION
By imposing a broad categorical duty upon landowners to protect their
invitees from the dangers inherent in natural bodies of water, the
Washington Supreme Court accorded regrettably insufficient consi-
deration to the strong public policy favoring access to the state's
waterways, the previously acknowledged financial burden associated
with such an obligation, and the limited beneficial impact of such a rule.
In confining the premises liability exemption for natural bodies of water
to situations where the injured party is a trespasser, Degel significantly
weakened Ochampaugh's policy of preserving access to the state's
streams, ponds, lakes, and rivers. While Degel may result in a marginal
increase in child invitee safety, the corresponding potential detriment to
the recreational, aesthetic, and environmental benefits conveyed by intact
and unfenced bodies of water will almost certainly outweigh any such
minimal gains. As such, the court should have preserved access to
Washington's "cherished amenities" '53 by recognizing a carefully limited
exception to a landowner's general duty of reasonable care.
15 1. See supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text.
152. See, e.g., Prosser, supra note 26, at 458 (noting that "the impressive number of cases of dead
children, attesting to their failure in fact to appreciate these risks, is sufficient in itself to cast some
doubt upon the validity of the assumption" that water-related child injuries should not be expected);
Note, supra note 127, at 271 (recognizing drowning as among leading causes of accidental child
death).
153. Ochampaugh v. City of Seattle, 91 Wash. 2d 514, 523, 588 P.2d 1351, 1356 (1979).
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